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| National Intelligence Daily Cable for Wednesday November 17, 1976. | |
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| The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing | 25X1 |
| senior US officials. | |

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| CHILE: Prisoner | 3 | | | |
| The m | ilitary government ns imprisoned unde esigned to diminis | er the state of | resterday to re- | 2 |
| major gesture d Chile's violati | on of human rights | si internacion | ar criticism or | |
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| In making the announcement, a junta spokesman said that the 18 other political prisoners "too dangerous to be freed in Chile" would be expelled if another country would accept them. The spokesman said two of the prisoners—Communist party chief Luis Corvalan and former Allende coalition senator Jorge Montes—would be released only if the USSR and Cuba would reciprocate by freeing two prominent prisoners. The Chileans called on world opinion to pressure the USSR and Cuba to take such reciprocal action. | 25X1 |
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| By nearly sweeping the jails clear at this time, the Pinochet government probably expects to lessen the impact of a critical report recently circulated by the UN human rights investigating group as well as hoping to improve its image with the new US administration. It also is a tacit admisunced by the unit of the new US administration. It also is a tacit admisunced by the unit of the new US administration. | 25X1 25X1 |
| ternal security is no longer a problem. | 20111 |
| GREECE: Student Demonstration | |
| Leftist students are likely to march on the US embassy in Athens today despite government efforts to dissuade them. If both sides remain adamant, there will probably be some violence, but Greek security forces should be able to protect the embassy. | 25X1 |
| The march is in commemoration of a student uprising in 1973 that brought down one junta which subsequently was replaced by a more repressive one. Some 34 students died in the uprising, one of the few instances of mass resistance to military rule in Greece. | 25X1 |
| The march to the US embassy called for by the communist— and leftist—dominated student union is a reflection of the standard leftist charge, believed by many other Greeks, that the US installed and supported the two juntas and was also responsible for their Cyprus policy. | 25X1 |
| The government seems determined to prevent the marchers from approaching the embassy, but if it should back down, it could cost the government some support among its conserva- | 25X1 |
| tive supporters. | 25X1 |
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| ALBANIA: Personnel Shifts | |
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| A large number of personnel shifts this month in the Albanian party and government apparently completes a three-year effort by party leader Hoxha and Premier Shehu to eliminate all opposition to their rigid, isolationist policy in foreign affairs and austere self-reliance in the domestic sector. | 25X1 |
| More than half the members of the previous 68-member Central Committee have been replaced since the party congress in Tirana early this month. The new body has been expanded to 77, including 24 newcomers. Twenty-five of the 38 candidate members, and 18 of the influential 21-member party control and auditing commission, are also new. Hoxha and Shehu have now replaced a quarter of the ruling Politburo, half of the cabinet, and the entire hierarchy of the armed forces. | 25X1 |
| On Saturday, the government announced the ouster of two deputy premiers. One was assigned to "other tasks," and the other returned to a ministerial post he last held in 1966. | 25X1 |
| Pali Miska, minister of industry and mining, was named to fill one of the vacant deputy chairman positions. Miska has been considered a rising star since he catapulted to the Politburo as a full member in 1975 after a purge of the economic ministries. He has evidently performed well. He has played a key managerial role in the completion of the giant steel-processing plant at Elbasanone of the largest developmental projects in Albaniawhich was built with Chinese technical and economic assistance. | 25X1 25X1 |
| USSR: Export Policy Shift | |
| The USSR has apparently given up hope of meeting its additional hard-currency needs from a major expansion in exports of manufactured goods to the West for the time being. | 25X1 |
| On at least two occasions last spring, then - Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Alkhimov reportedly indicated that the USSR would have to defer plans to favor exports of manufactured goods over raw materials. This shift in export strategy was confirmed recently by an official of the Institute of US and Canadian Studies in conversations held with US officials. | 25X1 |
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| Soviet interest in stressing manufactured goods exports had intensified since 1973, culminating in the priorities established at the 25th Party Congress held last March. The subsequent policy shift almost certainly has been prompted by Moscow's realization that its need for rapid expansion of hard-currency exports can be met only by boosting sales of raw materials to Western customers. Manufactured goods still represent | 25X1 |
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| only 4 percent of total sales to the West. | 25X1 |
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
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| CHINA: Trade | |
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| Recent statements by Chinese officials make clear that Peking intends to put renewed emphasis on foreign trade. The impact of any new policies, however, probably will not be felt until the second half of next year. | 25X1 |
| Foreign trade will thus not play a much larger role in the Chinese economy this year than in 1975. Currently, trade amounts to only 5 percent of gross national product. | 25X1 |
| Peking wants to avoid a repetition of the trade deficits with the West that occurred from 1973 to 1975. This year, China's trade balance will be in surplus as exports show modest gains and imports decline. Most important, the hard-currency deficit on non-Communist trade should fall to about \$100 million, compared with the \$1-billion deficit average in 1974-1975. | 25X1 |
| China is likely to return to the policy of 1972 of emphasizing trade to promote economic development, but will key import growth to export performance. An Italian delegation was recently told that China's policy on credits is unchanged. Supplier credits of up to five years will be used for major purchases; the Chinese will not seek direct loans or long-term credits. | 25X1 |
| In the past few weeks the Chinese press has been enthusiastic about foreign trade, widely quoting Chairman Mao's statement of 1949 on China's desire to increase trade as a means of developing production. Trade officials have been discussing trade expansion at meetings with visiting economic groups—including one with the National Council for US—China Trade in which China's need for purchases of capital goods and technology was highlighted. | 25X1 |
| The controversy between radicals and moderates over foreign trade policy apparently stalled the drafting of the new five-year plan that was to begin this year. Although foreign trade organizationsparticularly the one handling imports of whole plants and technologyremained active throughout the year, uncertainty about the overall plan undoubtedly constrained trade decisions. | 25X1 ₂ |
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| etter terms and m bly accept the c | th Israel and the more money from the arrent offerwhich aving the way for | ne EC, but th ch the EC ins | ney will prob- sists is non- | 2 |
| aneously conclude anean state seek: | e EC hoped that and with Lebanon ing an accord with on in that country talks.// | the only remain the Communi | aining Mediter- ity. The unstable | 2 |
| tatesmodeled at nd Morocco earlie | e agreements with fter accords signe er this yearprov Arab exports of | ed with Alger vide preferer | ria, Tunisia, ntial tariff re- | 2 |
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have refused to consider more effective action to counter the boycott--along the lines now being proposed in the US and Canada. They are reluctant to take any action which might impede the further growth of EC-Arab trade, and argue there is no evidence that the boycott has seriously harmed Israeli commercial relations with the EC.

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